MEDIA STORM
22.12.2007
In the 1990s, political observers were obsessed with spin doctoring—manipulating the media by convincing journalists of an alternate story that reframes a debate in the manipulator’s favour, often with the aid of loaded wording, rumour, and attacks on opponents. Public-relations and media-management consultants cashed in. Journalists left their vocation in droves to become spinmeisters. They convinced anxiety-prone clients that media attacks against them could be eliminated with some carefully worded messages, delivered deftly to the right audiences at the right moments.
Unfortunately for many government and business leaders, this isn’t as easy at it looks … at least when it comes to halting media feeding frenzies. That’s because the attentive public is becoming inured to phony marketing, dismissive of catch-phrases, and suspicious of self-serving pitches. Attackers are often just as savvy in the ways of media manipulation. Consultants rely on simplistic formulae that astute journos have become wise to. Cynicism abounds. Scandal sells. Snide comedians and talk-show hosts are now the ones people trust to deliver the news and they mock spin mercilessly. After the smoke has cleared, few people come out of a sensationalist media attack with their reputations intact, even if they are eventually found innocent of any wrongdoing.
One of my favourite books from the 1990s obsession is Spin (1998) by Michael Sitrick, a media-crisis manager who is well known in U.S. business circles. Sitrick speaks plainly about the limitations of conventional public relations tactics (e.g., issuing press-releases) and discusses a few advanced plays from the dark arts of media manipulation. Sitrick embraces the (strangely unpopular) idea of management by objective—clarifying what you want to ultimately achieve and working towards that goal, instead of a knee-jerk resort to the techniques that are handy or fashionable. Usually crises are best settled without spin and well outside of the media spotlight. If not, then a large repertoire of strategies can be employed, up to and including putting an enemy “under the wheel of pain” (the PR equivalent of Total War). Most of the time, crisis management involves coming up with the most convincing narrative, undermining the credibility of your opponent, and relying on a network of media contacts. Damage control, according to Sitrick, is an old-school method of last resort.
Eric Dezenhall and John Weber challenge this view head-on in their new book Damage Control. First, they argue that clients rarely have a realistic objective in mind. Embattled executives are often disoriented and egoistic. They want to be loved and respected, with their side of the story understood and embraced fully by the public. That almost never happens. Second, some organizations are incapable or unwilling to implement aggressive strategies, even as a matter of last resort, because of their risk-averse culture or weak leadership. During a crisis, many people inside the organization are trying to cover their asses and lobby for actions that are less painful for themselves. Some so-called “crisis teams” dither in wasteful fact-finding missions and “plan worship”. Third, some battles are unwinnable, at least in the short-run. Crises aren’t “managed” in the conventional sense. The best that can be hoped for may be the least painful option—success being mere survival and a sense of relief. Finally, public relations tactics have their limitations. Sometimes what’s called for is a fundamental change in the way business is conducted. For example, in the post-Enron era, public companies ejecting corrupt executives are able to weather the storm by fundamentally reforming the organization as part of the bargain.
Dezenhall & Weber reserve most of their scorn for opportunistic consultants who are too quick to sell public-relations spin as a cure-all. Such consultants are said to embrace the agreeability illusion, or the notion that there are only misunderstandings, not real conflicts of interest nor deep-seeded ideological strife. This leads to a media-management recipe of: positive messaging, protecting the brand through advertising, making nice with adversaries, speaking candidly at the first opportunity, and issuing heartfelt apologies. Collectively, these tactics are said to rarely work as an off-the-shelf strategy and they waste crucial time. Not enough consideration is given to the legal liability of an open admission of blame. Yet, these tactics superficially appeal to executives because they promise quick relief and don’t involve playing serious hardball. It’s the genteel option used by consultants to string along clients, at least until the crisis completely boils over. At that point, executives hopefully realize that they need to do something more cunning and decisive.
That characterization certainly doesn’t apply to Sitrick and his consultants, defenders of public relations who harbour no such illusions and have a track record of playing rough. And indeed, Dezenhall & Weber are not slighting media management per se given that they offer a lot of advice in that department. Yet, there is a certain type of in-house PR flack who seems to get up their noses: the overly cautious bureaucrat who is more experienced at crafting non-threatening prose than making tough decisions within the cut-throat political arena. These tend to be recruits from the advertising industry. Sitrick, Dezenhall, and Weber would undoubtedly all agree that crisis management is the domain of hardened realists who have an acute eye for strengths and vulnerabilities.
So what is the Dezenhall & Weber method? I’d summarize the most salient features as: shed delusions, play offense, and be decisive. I’ll speak to each in turn.
First, those under attack need to focus on what’s doable, not what they’d like to achieve in an ideal world. Dispose of the moral fables and appreciate the ugly truths. Much of the public will perceive the players in a story through the lens of blame, resentment, ideology, and personal identification. It’s about emotions and appealing to high principles, in other words, not about helping the public process information in a rational way. Any past goodwill that’s been built up or “brand equity” will not offer protection. Quite often, the conclusion will be that winning is not possible (or not worth the cost). According to Dezenhall & Weber, the faster a leader can come to this realization, the better the ultimate outcome.
Second, those under attack should not equivocate but instead pose risks for the attacker. Much of this is about changing the debate: telling a different story and making others understand that the attacker is not the noble one. An alternative story should play to the public’s preconceptions. Thus, every counter-argument should speak to a principle that helps obtain the moral high-ground. Important audiences should be “desensitized” to the allegations to prevent “trauma”. The quality of the opponent’s evidence should be questioned. The hypocrisy should be revealed. Don’t try to persuade enemies. Instead, mobilize natural allies to join the counter-attack and show them how best to do it. With such an offense, the attacker will have to devote time to defense and, ideally, will realize the futility of continuing the attack.
The third feature of Dezenhall & Weber’s approach is to lead with decisiveness, not through committee. Sometimes this means being proactive by preempting an imminent attack. All responses to attack will involve risk, so the authors advocate “playing the odds responsibly.” This doesn’t mean being cautious. It means being calculating. Entertaining ideal outcomes can become paralyzing. Instead, look at what’s viable and focus on execution. This includes making sure that employees of an organisation are on side and are not undermining the counter-attack.
As you might expect from a book offering such advice, ethical considerations are treated as an afterthought. Many of the examples Dezenhall & Weber use are of people that have been wronged by an unjust attack. But some examples are about defending wrongdoers. The notion of “corporate social responsibility” is waved off as being beside the point. There is a fine ethical line to walk in the profession of crisis management. Unfortunately, Dezenhall & Weber hardly bother to figure out where that line should be drawn. I wonder why they even raise the issue.
The book ends on a rather defeatist note. The authors itemize a number of trends that will make crisis management more difficult in the future. This includes the diminishing role of science and serious news reporting, the growing mob of blogger pundits, and the porousness of the organisation (allowing such things as whistleblowers). I think that Dezenhall & Weber exaggerate some trends (advocates of “socially responsible” investment) and are complicit with others (erosion of science and professional journalism). But I think its telling that many aspects of an open information-economy are perceived mostly as threats instead of opportunities. There is more to be explored about how this openness can be employed by crisis managers. I predict that’s where this literature will go next because the prevailing practice is already there. Activism and counter-activism are engaged in a perpetual arms race.
That last point speaks to one of the major weaknesses of the book: that there is relatively little discussion of tactical details. I can understand why. Too much discussion of tactics can bog down the reading experience. However, some of the most valuable lessons can come from discussing craft and finesse. Too much of Damage Control is a repetitive myth-busting exercise … and I’m not convinced that the authors really distance themselves from the mainstream of their profession. Indeed, books in this genre (including Sitrick’s) tend to be too preoccupied with saying: “here are the things I wish my clients would accept from the start so that I could do my job with less aggravation.” That has value. But a book that delves into the specifics of the hard graft of crisis management would be even more valuable. I predict that’s where this literature will not go next because consultants are reluctant to share their secret kung fu and expose clients as case examples.
Review by Peter Stoyko
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