Michael Shermer is a founder of the Skeptics Society, the editor of Skeptic magazine, and the scepticism columnist in Scientific American magazine. He is a psychologist and science historian. Science Friction is a collection of previously published essays about the “fuzzy shadowland” between that which can be confirmed by scientific inquiry and that which can not. I’m an admirer of Shermer’s work. I also recommend this book … with a few caveats. First, as with most compendiums of this kind, the essays are a mixed bundle only loosely tied together by the title theme. Second, prospective readers should know that Shermer views modern scepticism as a political movement with an activist agenda. It is a very American take on scepticism. This doesn’t always sit well with sceptics like myself who think political activism can sometimes unduly skew analysis and the selection of subject-matter. I will comment on this in greater detail momentarily.

Let’s begin with an account of the good bits.

Science Friction: Where the Known Meets the Unknown by Michael Shermer (Times Books, 2005), pp. xxxvii, 296.

The opening chapter is an excellent thumbnail sketch of scepticism and scientific thought. It discusses some of the biases that cause people to hold fallacious beliefs, including: seeking-out and considering only evidence that supports previously held beliefs (confirmatory bias); people’s tendency to consider others to be biased but not themselves to be (bias blind spot); and people’s tendency to judge others using general theories of behaviour yet judge themselves based on personal reflection (introspection illusion). Coincidences sometimes happen and randomness sometimes produces suspicious clusters of cases (e.g., unusual illnesses in a single locale), but neither should be mistaken for causal connections or a phenomenon in the absence of additional evidence (contrary to what many “trend journalists” suggest). Shermer then makes the case that science is the most accurate and reliable approach to knowledge there is. Science is self-correcting and self-policing. And contrary to American journalistic convention, there is no such thing as “two sides” to a scientific claim unless the data warrant consideration of two conflicting hypotheses.

Shermer also emphasizes that claims to truth in science are always provisional. Nothing is entirely proven to be a fact. To illustrate, a chapter explores a number of far-fetched claims (e.g., “oil is not a fossil fuel”) to show how sceptical inquiry works. The heresies of today may become the prevailing wisdom of tomorrow. Shermer adds that scepticism is not the view that we can never really know anything (nihilism), nor is it a knee-jerk rejection of all claims made by others (cynicism). Sceptics are “watchmen”, always vigilant in spotting bad ideas. Ideas are reflected upon in a thoughtful and inquisitive way.

Shermer uses scepticism to analyze a number of specific cases. The most interesting case involves three anthropologists who studied an Amazonian people (the Yanomamö) and came up with three radically different accounts of the same observations. This is an example of how the epistemological war within the discipline of anthropology (between cultural anthropologists and anthropological scientists) has led to the “spin doctoring” of scientific claims.1 Shermer also attacks the latest attempt by creationists to undermine evolutionary theory. This is the perennial struggle in America’s educational system whereby religious lobbyists have attempted to (a.) ban evolutionary studies, (b.) give equal time to creationism and evolution, (c.) give equal time to “creation science” and evolution, and now (d.) give equal time to “intelligent design” and evolution.  Shermer shoots down this latest attempt by analyzing creationist’s scientific disguise point-by-point.

There are also a few chapters devoted to a less formal application of sceptical thinking. In one chapter, Shermer shows that psychics are frauds by successfully conducting tarot card, palm, astrological, psychic and talking-to-the-dead readings. He makes himself convincing by using empathetic expressions and body posture, disclaimers, inference, vague language, loaded phrases, subtle probes, and a few insights about psychology. A chapter on sports psychology concludes that, although many successful athletes use psychological techniques, we do not yet know whether they are successful because we are less likely to hear about the unsuccessful cases. The more uncertain the outcome in a sport, the more superstitious an athlete is likely to be. Statistical analysis of basketball reveals that most “hot streaks” (e.g., six baskets in a row) are not significant deviations from probability. In other words, success does not build confidence and rhythm which, in turn, lead to more success. There is also a chapter about how Americans love to compose lists, such as top 100 greatest people and 10 most important events. These lists are highly arbitrary and reflect the personal preferences of the authors. Many are underpinned by an implicit theory of history (e.g., history is driven by “great men”, major events, or technological “waves”). Strangely, Shermer composes his own personal list that is only slightly less arbitrary than the norm.

Several chapters are devoted to Shermer’s model of history. According to the model, there are periods when history is not predictable because events are in flux in an apparently random way. These are the moments in which people are best able to exercise choice. These contingencies can include the introduction of ground-breaking inventions or the occurrence of catastrophic natural disasters. Conversely, there are periods of history that are highly predictable because change is highly constrained by identifiable factors. In these situations, people act according to necessity. By studying the interaction between these contingencies and necessities, one can figure out (in retrospect) a great deal about “what might have been” and “what had to be”. Some readers will recognize the resemblance with the evolutionary theory of punctuated equilibrium developed by Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould. Shermer also draws parallels with the field of chaos theory, which attempts to identify causal forces and predictable patterns from seemingly random groups of events. There is a chapter devoted to using “what if” questions (or counter-factuals, as logicians call them) to identify casual factors in history.2 This includes dividing factors along a continuum between proximate causes (the most evident and immediate factors) and ultimate causes (the larger forces at play). A number of cases are explored, including the famous story of Mutiny on the Bounty, the creation of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, and the municipal development of Auschwitz, Germany. Shermer’s aim is to encourage a more systemic and scientific study of history.

Now let’s turn attention to some of the problematic bits of Science Friction.

Shermer’s treatment of scepticism as a modern social movement places the book squarely within an American political frame. I can understand why many American sceptics choose to articulate their way of thinking in terms of political activism. The United States is a nation of joiners insofar as there is a long-standing and widely-observed tradition of membership in groups (political parties, interest groups, bowling leagues, et cetera). No where else will you find such an energetic democratic pluralism whereby well-funded groups battle it out in the public sphere like gladiators in an attempt to persuade the broader public. However, I prefer to think of scepticism as above the fray, as a tool for understanding politics which should (ideally) be independent of the biases inherent in political activism. Scepticism is a school of thought and an analytical skill, but not a club, a cause, or a “way of life”. I realize that sceptics may tend to hold similar views on a subject. I also think that scepticism is a force of good within political analysis and discourse. However, scepticism should be a check on questionable claims to truth and not be constrained by the political incentives posed by forwarding an activist agenda.

A case-in-point is Shermer’s advocacy of the term “bright” instead of atheist, agnostic, and secular humanist. The latter terms are considered to have a negative connotation and a more marketable label is sought. In marketing-savvy and hyper-competitive America it seems that everything these days must have an appealing brand. The problem, of course, is that bright is an invidious label, one which comes across as both a boast (“I’m smart …”) and a put-down (“… you’re not”). Shermer surveys the debate spawned by his advocacy of the term and looks at alternative labels. Here is my blunt contribution to the debate: it is contradictory for rhetorical labels and sloganeering—designed to evoke emotional responses and an affective sense of belonging—to be used to promote schools of thought that presumably stand for scientific reasoning and against the manipulation of belief using code words and emotional triggers. The goal should be to set an admirable example by using terminology that is clear and precise. This seemingly obvious argument against the term bright doesn’t make it into Shermer’s survey. As an aside, I like Padraig Reidy and Martin Rowson’s cheeky suggestion that the terms heretic and infidel be used instead of bright.3 These two alternatives don’t make Shermer’s list either.

Another case is Shermer’s ponderings about who started the sceptical movement. Ancient Greek and Enlightenment thinkers are given an absurdly brief nod. The founders of the so-called modern movement are said to be … [drum roll] … the scientist Martin Gardner and philosopher Paul Kurtz. If we are referring to the fore-runners of Shermer’s clubby Skeptics Society, then certainly this argument can be made (and is). I do think it is a bit myopic, however, to primarily equate scepticism with this clique. They certainly deserve their share of credit. However, Gardner, Kurtz, Richard Dawkins, James Randi and friends do seem to target the low-hanging fruit (the self-proclaimed mind-readers, séance mediums, psychic surgeons, alien abductees, magnetic healers, fortune tellers, and spoon benders, among others). Someone has to debunk this nonsense and I’m glad they’re on guard. I like to think that sceptical thinking applies to a much broader range of subject matter, however. Shermer would undoubtedly agree because of his own wide-ranging interests. Perhaps his survey of influential sceptics should reflect this.

Readers should be warned that there are some coma-inducing boring passages in Science Friction. I’m speaking mainly of Shermer’s content analysis of Stephen Jay Gould’s corpus of work. Content analysis is a quantitative exposition of a large body of text. This involves counting topics, themes, references, word usages and the like (usually with the help of sampling) in order to identify meaningful patterns. I can attest, by virtue of plenty of first-hand experience, that it is the research equivalent of working in the salt mines. One of my mentors called it “hard-bummed research” because of how the tedium makes you overly conscious of how your backside feels.  The monotony is only broken up by the paper-cuts. This is also what it feels like to read Shermer’s results. He hasn’t conducted a content analysis so much as built a statistical Taj Mahal out of Gould’s writing. It goes something like this: “The shortest essay was ‘Darwin’s Dilemma’ in 1974 at 1,475 words, and the longest (not counting four two-parters, the longest of which was 10,449 words) was ‘The Piltdown Conspiracy,’ in 1980 at 9,290 words, for an overall average of 4,166 words.” (p. 251) And so on. The essay is originally from an academic journal with a high threshold of tolerance for in-text data dumping. In case you’re wondering: yes, it turns out that Mr. Gould is quite an accomplished evolutionary theorist, historian, and baseball aficionado.

To sum up, let me restate that I recommend Science Friction despite its shortcomings. It is certainly an accessible read, as Shermer is one of America’s most articulate sceptics.

Review by Peter Stoyko

NOTES

1. The Yanomamö controversy is an extremely divisive academic brawl within American and Latin American anthropological circles. Shermer defends one of the principal characters, a fellow Darwinist named Napoleon Chagnon (who sits on the board of Skeptic, the magazine Shermer edits). Note that Shermer doesn’t attempt to settle the controversy in its entirety. He focuses on those contradictory claims which are based on the same observations.

2. It should be stressed that using counterfactuals to construct “what would have happened if” histories is pretty much an exercise in creative speculation. A number of silly pop-history books of this kind have surfaced in recent years.

3. Padraig Reidy and Martin Rowson are from New Humanist magazine. Their views about the bright controversy were expressed during an interview on the Little Atoms radio programme (broadcast December 9, 2005 on the Resonance FM network, London, UK). The interview can be downloaded in MP3 format here.